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Chapter I
The Universal Good
No Greek thinker after Plato could afford to neglect a consideration of the good;

the very emphasis which the Academy under its first

master had placed upon the Idea of the Good introduced into Greek thought,
if not a new concept, at least a very
what the good is.

definite~hilosophical

problem, namely,

Aristotle begins his Nichomaohean Ethics with a statement

of what he took to be the common aoceptation of the good: "Every art and
every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at
some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that
at which all things aim. ,,1

But even though any thinker may well have agreed

that the good may be understood as "that at which all things aim," this mere
generalization could not serve to distinguish from the opinions of others his
own view of what the good is and what role it plays in reality as a whole •.~
In the case of Aristotle the significance of this description crystallizes a
wealth of his own philosophical thought on the problem of the good that he
inherited from the Platonists.

I

Where his own philosophic opinions are solutions of problems that
had

be~p

faced by other thinkers, it is customarily in their contrast to the

.

answers advanced by the others that he presents them; and it is largely
against the background of the Platonic theory of the Ideas that he philo sophizes.

Particularly in his solution of the problem which we propose here

to discuss is this true.

As far as the nature of the good is concerned,
1

2

namely, what it is by reason of which things are called good, the

~'onoept

of

"that at which a11 things aim" might just as we11 apply to the Platonic Good;
for, so understood. it may be taken, on the one hand, as merely the good-ingeneral or, on the other, as some one and the same universal and subsistent
;. .Q

Good such as Aristotle considered the Platonists to mean.
It does not agree with his ovm thought, however, to accept the
latter interpretation of the nature of the goot for the reason that no
universal can be a substance in the precise fashion in which he interpreted
the Platonists to mean it.

Although the term "substance" may admit of

various usages, Aristotle holds that "substance, in the truest and primary
and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predioable of
a subjeot nor present is a subjeot,"2 whereas everything else other than
substance lacks one or both of these characteristios. 3

Aristotle allows

that the term be applied to those universals signifying the species of the
genera into which the primary substanoes fall;4 but, properly speaking,
those things are oalled substances which underlie everything else either as
the subject in which all other things are present or as the subject of whioh
they are predicated. 5
I

These characteristics of primary substanoe are clearly in
Aristotle's mind when he comes to the explicit examination of whether any
universal can be a substanoe.

The very universality signified by a uni-

versal term, as opposed to the singularity of the primary substanoe, makes
a subsistent universal impossible.

The individuality proper to substance

means precisely that the substance of a thing belongs to nothing else but to

3

that thing of which it is the substance.

The universal, on the

co~trary,

is

common to many individuals of the same class and belongs exclusively to none.
If it is to be a substance, it will be the substanoe either of all or of none
of the members of the olass.

For to oall it the substanoe of one member only

is to identify that member with every other~~a single individual.

The

universal, on the supposition that it is a substanoe, would be predioated

.

alike of all its individuals and would thus belong to every other member in
the same way that it belongs to that of whioh it is supposed to be the substanoe, namely, as the substance;

but things possessing an identical sub-

stanoe oonstitute, in virtue of the faot that substanoe belongs alone to that
of whioh it is the substanoe, a numerical identity.

But by the same token,

neither oan the universal be the substanoe of all the individuals of a olass,
for then it could be peculiar to no individual as its sUbstanoe. 6

Further-

more, even the fact that the uni verss.l is predioable of anything whatever
denies it primary substantiality.7

As a universal predicate, moreover, it

indicates not a "this" or a primary substanoe, but rather a "such" or a
quality. 8
Aristotle sums up his position when he applies the argument to the
universals "being" and "unity":
In general nothing that is oommon is substanoe; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to
that whioh has it, of whioh it is the substanoe. Further, •
that whioh is one oannot be in many plaoes at the same
time, but that whioh is oommon is present in many plaoes
at the same time; so that olearly no universal exists
apart from its individuals. 9
This is precisely his objection to the subsistent universal Ideas or Forms
of the Platonists.

The Ideas must be considered to be substanoes sinoe

I

4

their participants share in them as in something not predicated of4'a subject,
that is, as in an individual;IO and if they are substances, it is right to
grant them separate existence. ll

But the difficulty is how they can be

allowed subsistence if the "one-over-many", the character common to several
individuals, is the Form.

This would make tht universal to exist apart from

its individuals, and thus would follow the impossibility of a substance and

.

that of which it is the substance having existence apart from each other. 12
The difficulties 13 attendent upon substantializing a universal term are inescapable in the Aristotelian thought.

Substantiality and universality are,

in a sense, inversely proportionate. 14

Taking substance in the strict sense,

however, if anything is a substance in this way, it cannot be a universal in
any sense; and, per contra, if anything is universal, it cannot be a substance.

The universal subsistent Good of the Platonists falls under the

same criticism as the other Ideas.
Idea of the Good would have

As a matter of fact, to Aristotle the

even a less valid claim to substantiality than

the universal representing a species or genus of substance; for at least the
latter, and especially species, constitutes the appropriate definition in
which the primary substance falls and by that token alone is allowed to be
I

considered substance. 15
The universal good, therefore, which Aristotle accepts as the
object of aim cannot be a subsistent entity.

Rather it is merely the.uni-

versal conception that applies in common to those things which, as being
desirable, are good; and, in consequence, it possesses, not the unity of a
primary substance, but merely a logical unity.

5

Chapter

II

Predication of the Good
The logical unity of the universal good by virtue of whioh it is
predicated of those things that are good

.

giye~

...,

rise to the further question

of the manner in whioh it is predicated of them.
mode of being are different are called "good."

Many things whose very
The term "good" is attributed

to all those beings which the Platonists call~ participants in the Idea of
the Good; but the fact that those beings do not belong to the same genus of
being presents the problem of whether or not "good" is applied to all of
them with the same meaning in each case.
In this question it is in his antithesis to the Platonic view that
Aristotle takes up the problem and subjects the Idea of the Good to criticism
preoisely on the point that it must be predicated in the same sense or univocally of all things that are called good by participation in it.

For

Aristotle considers the proponents of the theory of the Ideas to have

post~

lated the Ideas set over classes of things in which they admitted no priority
and posteriority in the respect in which the individual of any class belonged
to it and shared in the Idea of it.l

But "good", on the other hand, falls

into all the categories; it has as many senses as "being."

It is applied,

for example, in the category of substance to God and to reason, in that of
quantity to the moderate amount, in that of quality to the virtues, in that
of relation to the useful, in that of time to the opportune, in that of plaoe
to the right locality.

It follows, therefore, that there is no universal

Good univocally predicable of all goods;

for substance, the

~~

existent,

I

6

is prior in nature, for example, to what is only relative. 2

In consequence,

the good would have a prior and posterior sense in being predicated of things
which are in their natures prior or posterior in respect to one another.

If.

on the contrary, the good were taken as univooal, it would have to be predicable in only a single category; and the ablu1d consequenoe would follow
that things falling into the other categories could not be oalled good. S

,.

In this criticism of Plato, Aristotle comes closest to the explicit
solution of the problem involved in the predication of "good."

He begins the

Nichomachean Ethics with a consideration of what the good-in-general means,
and he makes the nature of the good the occasion for his oriticism of the
Ideal Good because the latter was considered to be universal and not
restricted to ethical matters.

~e

had perhaps better consider the universal

good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it,"4 he begins and apologizes
for his attack on his former master and fellows; but though his criticism
establishes the impossibility of an univocal universal good, he hardly oonsiders the problem adequately treated.

When the consideration of the uni-

versal good has served its purpose, he dispenses with it.
asks, "do we mean by the good?

"What then," he

It is surely not like the things that only
I

chanoe to have the same name.

Are goods one, then, by being derived from

one good or by all oontributing to one good, or are they rather one by
analogy? •••• But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the
present; for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to
another branch of philosophy."5
Considering that "good" predicates in the same fashion as "being",
Aristotle's own answer to the question is the second alternative named; that

7

is, "good" is predicated by analogy or proportion.

The branch of 1>hilosophy

to which he refers a more accurate solution of the question is evidently ,the
Metaphysics where the predication of "being", but not explicitly "good", is
oonsidered in various contexts.

The "senses of being" of which he makes use

in his analysis are the categories.

While "i-;" belongs to all things that

can be said to be, it answers to various senses in respect of the way they
are.

Primarily and in a simple sense it beloIljs to ·substance; and only

secondarily and in a limited sense it belongs to quantity, quality, relation,
and the other categories.

For substance is prior to the other senses of

"being", firstly, in definition because it must enter into the definition of
the others, secondly, in knowledge because a thing is known in the strictest
sense by what it is rather than by the acoidental features that it possesses,
and thirdly, in time beoause all the other things have their being only in
substanoe.

Consequently, substanoe alone

~

the other oategories the case is different.

by no mere ambiguity; but with
In regard to them, it is like

...

the use of "is" in the case of that which "is not," as some say, with
emphasis on the linguistic form, that what is not

~,

not is simply but is

non-existent. 6
I

How, then, may it be said that "being" is predicated of all the
categories, recognizing that it has prior and posterior significations
corresponding to the priority or posteriority of the thing of which
predicated?

i~

is

The truth is, Aristotle points out, that we do not mean the

same thing in each case nor do we mean different things; that is, the predication is neither univocal nor equivooal. 7
in virtue of a referenoe

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Rather, "being" is predicated
thing.

The case is the same as

8

the predication of "healthy" or "medical."

Everything that is cal.... ed

"healthy" is so called by a proportion to one central point, that is, health,
as being, for example, preservative, productive, symptomatic, or capable of
health.

Everything called "medical" is likewise so called in virtue of its

reference to a common end, as, for exe.mple,·p~ssessing the medical art,
exercising it, being adapted to it, or being a function of it.

"Health"

..

itself and the "medical art" itself are called, "healthy" and "medical"
respectively, primarily and without such qualifioations or such referenoes.
In the case of "being" substance is the central point of referenoe which is
said to be simply, whereas all other things!!! by referenoe to substanoe.
"Some things," Aristotle says in illustrating the point, "are said to be
because they are substances, others because they are affeotions of substanoe,
others because they are a prooess toward substanoe, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance,
~r

of things that are relative to substance, or negations of one of these

things or of substance itself."S
The case, as Aristotle has indicated, stands the same with the
predication of "good."

Its prior and posterior signifioations, correspond I

ing to those of "beings", accounts for the fact that it is predioated neither
univocally nor equivocally.9

It is, therefore, like "being", an analogous

term; every sense of "good" is referred to what is good in the striot&St
sense, namely, substanoe.

Just as individuals in the oategories of quantity.

or quality, or relation, or the others are not unless they are quantities,
qualities, or relations of a substanoe, so neither are such goods as the
moderate amount, or the virtuous, or the useful, good unless they are the

9

.'

moderate amount for a substanoe, the virtue of a substanoe, the useful to a
substance.

I

10

Chapter III
The Good as Cause
The notion of the good as a cause in Aristotle's thought is implied
in the statement that it is that at which aII~things aim, for then it appears
as identified with the end considered as the final cause of any motion what-

..

ever; and it follows also from this conception, that the good. as a cause, is
pre-eminent &nong the causes.

The four causes make their first explicit

appearance in the Metaphysics as the starting-point and frwmework of the
exwmination and criticism of the thought of previous philosophers in their
search for principles

and causes; and here the final cause is represented

as "the purpose and the good, II to which Aristotle adds by way of explanation
"for this is the end of all generation and change."l

Throughout the sub-

sequent critioism whenever he turns expressly to the oonsideration of the
final oause in previous philosophy, he retains the same oonoeption: in
relation to those who posited more than a material cause, he oalls it "that
for whose sake aotions and changes and movements take plaoe;"2 and in relation to the Platonists, he oalls it "that for whose sake both all mind and
I

the whole of nature are operative."3

This oonneotion with the field of

ohange establishes the good as a motive principle in all ohange, but
prinoiple whioh, as aimed at, exeroises its oausality at both terms
motion.

For it is the

~,

a
o~

the

but only in the sense in whioh that term is em-

ployed to denote the final oause or purpose of the motion.

In a disoussion

of the meaning of the term "limit" Aristotle makes this distinction by pointing out that one of the senses of "limit" is equivalent to "the end of the

11

thing" which_ in general_ means only a last stage towards which
action are and not that

~

m~ment

and

which they are; he adds, however, "sometimes it

is both, that trom which and that to which the movement is_ i.e. the tinal
oause."4 Thus, he excludes trom purposive aotion, that is, aotion done for a
good, those movements owing to chance and

slJ'o~aneit'

which oan be said to

oome to an end in the sense of a last stage, but not beoause

~

the end as

the limiting point at whioh the motion is aimed from its initiation. 6 As the

•

limit taken in this sense_ the good is attained in the completion of the
motion, "for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. 1t7
The kind ot oausality whioh the good exeroises, oonsidered as both the beginning and the end of the motion_ is that of a prinoiple of motion whioh is itself unmoved.
Moreover, the good, considered in its relation to the other oauses,
is pre-eminently the oause of causes.

When all things which can be oalled

oauses in the primary and non-acoidental sense of the term are oonsidered,
they tall into the four familiar divisionsl those whioh are substratum, those
whioh are the essenoe, those whioh are the souroe of motion or rest, and
finally those remaining whioh are the end.

These last, however, Aristotle
I

says_ "are oauses as the

~

and the good of the other things; tor that tor

the sake of whioh other things are tends to be the best and the end of the
other things. nS
are final oauses:

And in a parallel disoussion he repeats of the thing&whioh
"The others are oauses in the sense of the end or the good

of the rest; for 'that for the sake of whioh' means what is best and the end
of the things that lead up to it. n9
It is the faot that the end is a first principle or oause that

12
allows the good to enter at all into metaphysical inquiry, which i,'concerned
with the principles and causes of all things; and it is the causal pre-eminence of the good which gives to Wisdom its architectonio oharaoter over all
sciences:
The science which knows to what en~~ach thing must be done
is the most authoritative of the soienoes, and more authoritative than any anoillary soience; and this end is the good
of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole
of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then,
[soil. that the wise man pursues his~oience for its own
sake and orders but is not ordered] the name in question
[soil. Wisdom] falls to the same soienoe; this must be a
soienoe that investigates the first prinoiples and oauses;
for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the oauses. lO
It is, moreover, the same pre-eminenoe of the good whioh makes Politios the
most arohiteotonio of all the arts inasmuoh as the art whioh orders whatever
is done in the state is the art whioh is oonversant with the highest good of
man. 11

And, in general, where many arts fall under the same capacity, it is

the master art whioh determines the end for each of the inferiors. 12

More-

over, where the unity of the first philosophy appears as a matter for dis-

~

pute, Aristotle argues, on one side of the question, that if there is a
scienoe oorresponding to each of the oauses, in one sense Wisdom ought to be
that which deals with the good preoisely from the fact that it is the most
authoritative of the scienoes and that the good is the oause for the sake of
whioh the other oauses are. lS
Yet, on the other hand, the nature of the good as a principle whose
oausality is exeroised over moving things is the very reason why, in regard
to the offioe of Wisdom to investigate the oauses of
culty as to its unity should ocour at all.

~

things, the diffi-

As Aristotle puts the problem:

There are many things to whioh not all the principles

I

13
pertain. For how can a principle of change or the natur~'
of the good exist for Q~changeable things, since everything that in itself and by its own nature is good is an
end, and a cause in the sense that for its sake the other
things both come to be and are, and since an end or purpose is the end of some aotion, and all aotions imply
change? So in the oase of unohangeable things this prinoip1e oou1d not exist. 14
This conoeption of the good as a motive cause and its oonsequent
inseparability from the field of motion in which its final causality is
exeroised gives Aristotle further reason for r~eoting a subsistent Good as
a Platonic Idea.

The Ideas of the P1atonists he finds incapable of being a

prinoiple or cause in any sense whatever, but particularly does he find them
to fail to account for the universal phenomenon of change in peroeptib1e
things.

To be sure, it was in seeking the cause of peroeptib1e things, the

causes both of their being and their beooming, that the Platonists were led
to posit the existence of subsistent and universal Forms; but the mode of
causality which they were thought to exercise in respect to sensible substances, "sharing" or "partioipation", is to Aristotle so muoh empty talk.la.
For Forms, considered in their oharacter as subsistent entities apart from
the partioular things of which they are said to be the oauses, are not causes
in any of the usual senses of "from. n16

This means to Aristotle that they

fail as prinoip1es both of the being and of the becoming of things; for the
senses in which a thing is said to come from another are exhausted by the
four primary kinds of oausality, material and formal, effioient and final,
whioh are adequate to acoount for both being and becoming, and by two secondary senses, that in which a thing is said to come from the whole if it is an
effect of the part in anyone of the first four senses, and that which applies
to the sucoessive parts of a temporal sequence. 17

Aristotle does not allow

I

14

that the mode of "partioipation" oorresponds to any of these literltl and
intelligible senses.

To say that anything oomes from the Idea as from a

"pattern" is no more than a poetioal metaphor; for evidently one thing may
be or beoome like another without having been patterned after it# whether or
not one oalls that other eternal. 18

The restit of attempting to explain

peroeptibles by subsistent and universal oauses is that the Platonists have
given up the searoh for the oauses of peroepti~le things. 19

In the first

plaoe# a universal oause does not exist; the individual is oaused by the
individual # in the sense of matter, form# and agent. 20

In the second place,

even if the Forms do exist as universals, they fail to oontribute effioienoy
in regard to being and beooming.

For the individual has its form and oomes

to have its form, at least in produots of nature, by the aotivity of an agent
specifically the same as its effect and adequate to causing the form to be in
another matter; oonsequently the Ideas would still neoessitate an agent for
the things whioh are said to share in them. 21
be

~

If the Forms were supposed to

particulars as well as being subsistent apart from them, they might be

thought to be causes as entering into a composition, as white oauses whiteness in the white objeot; but even this view is impossible. 22
I

But if subsistent universal Ideas fail to explain the being and
becoming of things either as material, formal, or efficient oauses, no less
are they useless as final oauses.

Aristotle points out that the IdeaS'in

general have no oonnection with the final cause, namely, "that for whose sake
both all mind and the whole of nature are operative.,,23

As for the Idea of

the Good, the Platonists indeed oall the good a prinoiple; but how it exeroises its causality, whether as an end, an agent, or a form, they do not

15
say.24

Rather, they really make the good a oause per aooidens, no.less than

had Empedooles and Anaxagoras whose "friendship" and "reason", respeotively,
were olassed as goods.

"That for whose sake aotions and ohanges and move-

ments take plaoe," Aristotle says of them, "they assert to be a oause in a
way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the w¢y~n whioh it is its nature to be
a oause •••••• It turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the

,. -

good is a oause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only incidentally. "25

That is, the good is considered a cause in the sense that the

cause operating to bring about the effect happens to be good or has the good
connected with it as an incidental attribute, not in the sense that it is the
final oause for whose sake the motion takes plaoe. 26

As a matter of faot,

the Platonists must suppose the good as a prinoiple other than and superior
to the Forms in order to explain their own theory of partioipation; otherwise
the question why partioular things oome to partioipate in them and why they
do participate in them remains unanswered. 27
On

the other hand, the good whioh Aristotle insists is a motive

prinoiple in all movements finds its causal virtue explained in his own
theory of movement.

And sinoe movement, in its broadest sense, is the pasI

sage of anything from a state of potentiality to one of actuality,
Aristotle'S own solution lies in his conception of potency and act.
Aristotle points out that the term "potency" may have severeJ.
senses; but disregarding those which are potencies only by an equivocation,
as, for example, the so-oalled "powers" of figures in geometry, all potencies
are originative souroes of some kind, and each is called a potency by reference to what is primarily the meaning of the term.

Potency in its primary

16
signification extends only to those things which involve a referen8e to
motion, and thus its strictest sense applies to what is an "originative
source of change in another thing or in the thing itself ~ other.,,28

The

act of building, for instance, is a potency or a source of change which
exists in something other than the thing bei~g~built, that is, in the agent
who possesses the productive knowledge or the art of building by which he
builds; the art of healing is a potency or a source of change in the doctor

•

who heals himself, but the potency is in him as something other than himself
~

healed, that is, in him as the agent who has the practical knowledge or

the medical art by which he heals. 29
sense.

Other senses of potency relate to this

Thus, potency is likewise an originative source of a thing's being

changed by another or by itself qua other.

Bricks and stones, for example,

have a potency for being changed into a house by the art of building exercised by the builder; the potency for being healed is in the doctor who heals
himself, but it is in him not insofar as he is the agent or healer, but insofar as he is the patient or the healable.

These two senses of potenoy, of

aoting on another and of being acted on by another, agree in that both are
capacities.

The difference is that the active potenoy resides in the agent
I

and the passive potency resides in the patient.

Moreover, each potenoy

whether in the agent or the patient is a capacity for acting or suffering in
the manner proper to it.

An agent has the capacity of heating or building

because it has heat or the art of building by which it can heat or can build;
a patient has the potency of being burned or of being crushed because it is
oily or yielding in a certain way.30
Actuality, on the other hand, is correlative to potency; and when

17

Aristotle oomes to desoribe it, he says that it is the "existenoe 8f a thing
not in the way which we express by 'potentially,II31

The way in whioh potenoy

and actuality are to be known is not by definition, but by their proportion
to each other; and he illustrates the proportion by ohoosing particular oases
in which, he notes, potenoy will be found t ; ixtend further than to that
whose nature it is to move another or be moved by another.

Aotuality is to

..

potency as the builder building is to the builder capable of building, as the
thing awake to the thing asleep, as the seer exeroising his sight to the seer
with his eyes shut,
----

as that whioh is shaped out of the matter to the matter

--------

unshaped, as that whioh is wrought to that which is unwrought.

In conse-

quence, aotuality and potenoy are terms which themselves are used analogouslye

For the aotual is said of that which exists as form to matter and of

that which exists as movement to the capacity for movement. 32
The relation of proportionality represented respeotively by the
actual and the potential gives rise to the question of priority and posteri-

...

ority beoause wherever the analogy or proportion of several things occurs, it
is a question of reference of one thing to another and of the central point
to whioh the referenoe is made.

For Aristotle, the problem, in one aspeot,
I

at least, is whioh of the two divisions of being in question oan be called
"oomplete" relative to the other, inasmuch as from the point of view of
nature or "substantiality," that is, relative sufficienoy of being,33 the
complete is prior to the inoomplete.

When Aristotle oonsiders the question

on this basis, he establishes the priority of the aotual over the potential
from the standpoint of the final oause or the good.

An analysis of becoming

shows that the posterior in the process of beooming is prior in nature
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because that which is in the process of beooming has not yet its ferm whereas, on the contrary, the form is present at the realization of the prooess in
the completely constituted being.

For everything that moves moves toward an

end for the sake of which the movement is, and the aotuality at which the
movement aims is the end or the good. 34
The actual, then, is the complete reality; and by this line of
reasoning it appears as such from its nature as the final cause.
on the other hand,

Potency is,

•
inoomplete reality relative to its proper actuality and is

made oomplete by its actualitye

The argument, Aristotle points out, applies

to actuality in the sense both of the actual as form to matter~5 and of the
actual as movement to the oapaoity"for movement, that is, in those oases
where the end is realized in the movement itself.

For Aristotle draws the

distinction sharply between aotive potencies whose exercise he calls "movements" and those whose exeroise he oalls "aotualities", and the basis of the
distinction is the end for the sake of whioh each exists.

In the common and
~

strict sense of the term, potency refers to the oapaoity of a being to move
another or to be moved by another
oo~mon

~

other, and thus also actuality in its·

acceptation is identified with movement or the realization of this
I

potency.

That is why movement is commonly denied to non-existent things such

as the objects of thought and desire; for if they were moved, they would have
to be called actual.

Aristotle himself does not aocept the identification of

actuality with movement, for movement as suoh is inoomplete.

Rather, he dis-

tinguishes "movements", properly so-called, whose end or actuality is realized in a produot apart from the movement itself, from movements properly
called "actualities" in which the end is present in and realized simultaneous-
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ly with the movement itself.
examples of the former.

Making

thin~ wa1king~

learning,

are

buil~1ng

These activities have a limit in the effeot they

are intended to produoe; none of them is in the strictest sense an end in
itself, but all are relative to the end for which they are exeroised.

The

removing of fat, for example, is relative t~ the end of thinness in the
bodily parts, which is not achieved while the process is going
when aohieved, is the point at whioh the

proce~s

•

movement is said to have attained is actuality.

on~

but

whioh~

is complete and at which the
So,

too~

with others of this

kind; all of them are realized in the thing being produced.

"The actuality,"

Aristotle says, "is in the thing that is being made, e.g. the art of building
is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is
being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement 1s
in the thing that is being moved."36
seeing, understanding, theorizing,

On the other hand, such aotivities as

thinking~

living, being happy are move-

ments which have no such limit and whose end is the movement itself.
same time," Aristotle explains,

~e

"At the

are seeing and have seen, are understand-

ing and have understood, are thinking and have thought •••••• At the same time
we are living well and have lived well, are happy and have been happy.

If
I

not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the prooess of making
thin oeases: but, as things are, it does not oease; we are living and have
lived. u37

The differenoe, then, between the aotualization of the two ~inds

of active potenoies lies in the manner in whioh the end is present to each.
In produotions,whether of art or nature, the end is outside the agent and
the aotuality is

~

the produot, and, this being so, they are inoomplete; in

the other aotivities in whioh no produot is aimed at outside of the aotivi-
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ties themselves l the end is in the agent and the movement is
very exercise.

compl~te

in its

In this much l where the action is the end l the movement is

properly an "actualitY"1 and Aristotle notes that "even the word tactuality~
is derived from 'action'. and points to complete reality.n38
Thus it is that the actuality whic~~s the complete reality existing at the term of any movement l whether it be the result of the realization
of a capaoity to reoeive or to aot, or, in the ,latter case, whether it be the

•

term of a "movement" in the proper sense or of an "aotuality", is the end or
the good for whioh the movement exists and for which it is initiated.

It is

in the attainment of the actuality proper to the potency of its being, then,
that a thing is said to be complete in respect of having attained its end and
thereby is said to be good.

I
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Chapter IV
Nature and the Good
The priority of that whioh has its end or its good over that whioh

.....

laoks it, of the realized over the unrealized, of the oomplete over the inoomplete, in short, of the aotual

over the potential, is at the basis o£ the

emphasis whioh Aristotle plaoes upon the £unotlon of any being, that whereby
it attains the £ul£illment of its potentialities.
Matter exists in a potential state, just beoause it may
oome to its form, and when it exists aotuallz, then it
is in its form. And the same holds good in all oases,
even those in whioh the end is a movement. And so, as
teaohers think they have aohieved their end when they
have exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise. l
When Aristotle undertakes an inquiry into nature, it is preoisely from the
point of view of the natural thing's funotion, the prooesses whereby eaoh
thing realizes its good in the aotualizations of its potentialities; for the
exeroise of the funotion is the exhibition of the thing's nature:
What a thing is is always determined by its funotion: a
thing really is itself when it oan perform its funotion;
an eye, for instanoe, when it oan see. When a thing oannot do so it is that thing only in name, like a dead eye
or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a
saw than one in a pioture •••••• They all [soil. natural
things] are what they are in virtue of a oertain power
of aotion or passion. 2
For sinoe all originative sources are potenoies, the nature of a thing'as an
originative souroe falls into the genus o£ potenoy;3 and it is the nature of
a thing whioh exhibits the thing to be what it is preoisely in its natural
funotions, preoisely in the prooesses whereby it aohieves the good pro,per to,
it.4

I
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Aristotle defines nature as

2! being

~ ~..!!!. ~ ~

whioh

~

"~

souroe

~

oause

~

being

~oved ~

belongs primarily, in virtue of itself

and not in virtue of' a oonoomitant attribute. "5

But when he oomes to the

aotual determination of' what the prinoiple of motion in the natural thing is,
he finds that "nature" may be understood in1n~ than a single sense. 6 Matter, indeed, was considered to be the nature of the thing by all those think-

,.

ers who posited elements of one sort or another, for matter is that out of
whioh the natural objeot is made or of whioh it consists and that which persists in all ohanges.

Aristotle, however, oonsiders the nature of a thing

to be primarily its form, "f'or a thing is more properly said to be what it is
when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially,"7 and
the things that come to be and are by nature are not yet said to have their
nature Itunless they have their form or shape. itS

On the other hand, things

are not striotly works of nature nor, indeed, of art if they are only potentially natural or artistio things; rather, matter oan be oalled "nature"
because it has the potenoy of reoei~ng the form,9 beoause, in other words,
as a passive potenoy, it is a prinoiple of ohange in natural substanoes.
The aotuality, then, that is possessed by the natural being in
virtue of whioh it is properly said to be natural or to have a nature is the
. form; and just as the aotuality or the oomplete reality in general is the end
or the good, so likewise is the form the end with respeot to the natural substanoe whioh is oomposed of matter and form.

For while the oauses are four

in number, matter, form, agent and end, in the oase of things whioh oause
motion by being themselves moved, form and agent and end coincide.

The form

is the effioient oause inasmuoh as the natural being produces by virtue of

I
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its nature or form an effect specifically the same as itself.

It 1's, more

important, the final cause sinoe the aotuality for the sake of whioh any
natural thing exeroises the functions proper to its active and passive potencies is the form itself either as the actualization of another's passive
potency, considered from the point of view ;f~he patient receiving the form,
or as the aotualization of its own active potency, considered from the point
of view of the agent communicating the fonn. lO

•

The major role of the form, then, is precisely the end or the good
in respeot of natural substanoes.

The matter is the passive potency which

receives its actuality from the form;ll and the form, as giving aotuality to
the matter, is pre-eminently the good, for it is actual existenoe in the form
at which matter may be said to aim. l2

The form, oonsidered in its aotive

potentiality, is the agent that efficiently initiates any ohange; but inasmuoh as the final reason of its aotivity is to give aotuality to the matter
or, in general, to any other being having the oapaoity reoeptive of the form,
~

the form is the good, whioh finally originates the movement and determines
the limit of the process.

That is why Aristotle says, oonoerning the dis-

tinotion of the oauses in respect of substance, that "while the effioient
I

cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruotion, the final oause is
sought in the oase of being also."13

For the agency of the form is exercised

only so long as the movement is incomplete; but when the process has

r~aohed

its oompletion, the agenoy oeases and the end or the good for which the prooess has taken plaoe is realized in the very being of the substance as a oertain matter now having its form.

That is the reason, likewise, that to the

question "why" in physioal inquiry the answer in regard to final cause,
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"because it is better thus", must admit the restriotion "not withowt qualification, but with reference to the essential nature in eaoh case."14

For al-

though the form in general is the good of the being, and also the end of
every motion, primarily it is the form as the nature of the thing to which
the good of each is referred.
Because the form of the natural substance is its end and because
the form is the end of every natural movement, Aristotle places nature in

•

general in the class of causes that act for the sake of something.

Chance

and spontaneity, while they are likewise causes which act tor the sake ot
something, do not, however, produoe their results either always or for the
most part in the same way.

They are rather inoidental oauses ot effects

whioh might be brought about by intelligenoe or by nature in an invariable or
almost invariable manner.

Although they aot for the sake of something, it is

not the result which they aotually produoe for whioh they aot.

The tripod

may have fallen in virtue of the natural tendenoy of its predominant heavy
matter to move downward, but the faot that it fell on its teet in the position suoh as to serve for a seat is incidental to the end for whioh it fell;
and this result is of the kind that oould have oome to pass by the aotion of
I

an agent intending it.

The man engaged in oolleoting subscriptions for a

feast may go to the market-plaoe for one of many possible reasons and, while
there. chance to meet a friend trom whom he solicits a subscription; and this
result could have been the real object of his going to the market-place.

The

results, then, of chance and spontaneity arise from an external cause in the
sense that the inoidental cause of their coming about is not the cause by
which they are normally or always effected.

Nature, on the other hand, in
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virtue of the faot that the natural substanoe acts in virtue of a

~rinciple

within it and produces a result whioh is the proper and normal or invariable
result for the sake of whioh it aots. is a oause whioh aots for an

end~!!

and not inoidentally.15
From the faot of relatively invar!atle results of natural action
Aristotle argues that natural aotion is for the sake of the end produoed and
not the action of an inoidental and hence inde{inite oause. for the only suffioient reason for the achievement of suoh effects is that the end or good is
attained by the natural and proper aotivity of the form actualizing an appropriate matter.

Coinoidence oannot aocount for the faot that. for example.

the front teeth of animals are always slender and sharp for tearing food and
the molars thick and dull for grinding it; for if the oharacter of teeth were
the result of ohance or spontaneity and hence were not constituted as they
are in view of the end for which they are fitted, they should neither always
nor normally be of suoh oharaoter. lS

The same is true of any coming-to-be in
~

nature, as Aristotle argues against Empedooles. "for the things whioh oometo-be by natural process all exhibit, in their ooming-to-be, a uniformity
either absolute or highly regular: while any exoeptions -- any results whioh
are in aocordanoe neither with the invariable nor with the general rule -are produots of ohance and luok.

Then what is the cause determining that man

oomes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) oomes-to-be from
wheat, either invariably or generally? •••• The cause in question [soil. of
the proportions of the element in natural bodies] is the essential nature of
eaoh thing -- not merely •••• 'a mingling and a divoroe of what has been mingled.,"17

The coming-to-be of natural substanoes, then. is due to the nature

I
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of each thing; and while the adherents of chance and spontaneity as'sign the
excellence of eaoh thing to the "mingling of elements", rather nit is
~oil.

~

the natureJ which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its

'good,n.lS
The striot parallelism that AristcrtI'e finds be"t!feen the functions
of art and nature provides another argument for the teleological activity of
natural agents.

In both art and nature the form of the 'product to be pro-

•

duoed is that whereby the agent aots to embody the form in its appropriate
matter.

Just as man produces man and wheat produoes wheat by having the form

of man or wheat, so does health produoe health and house produoe house; for
the medical art and the building art are precisely the form of health and the
form of house in the soul of the artist.

These forms, like the forms of the

natural agents, are the active potencies whereby the artist causes the same
specifio form to be in the thing produced.

In art, however, reasoning is

involved, not on the part of the art itself, to be sure, but on the part of
the artist.

For the exeroise of the art, it is required that before the

aotual exeroise of the artistic funotions, the artist decide upon the necessary dispositions of materials and the series of means, whether aotivities or
I

instruments, that will cause the form to be in matter.

When his deliberation

reaohes a point of aotion immediately within his power, he may begin the
series that will result, if nothing hinders, in the end he has intended. 19
The series of steps to a oompletion wherein the end or the good is effeoted
is the same in nature as in art, each preoeding step for the sake of the next
and all for the sake of the end at which the prooess reaches the good for
which it was originated. 20 The series in nature is obvious in the work of
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non-intelligent animals. for example, spiders. ants. and the like,·and even
in plants.

This teleologioal view Aristotle finally returns to its speoula-

tive basis:
If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider .its web, and plants grow
leaves for the sake of the fruit andrsend their roots down
(not up) for the sake of nourishment. it is plain that this
kind of oause is operative in things whioh come to be and
are by nature. And since 'nature' means two things, the
matter and the form, of whioh the latter is the end, and
since all the rest is for the sake 01 the end, the form
must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of
which. ,.,21
It is a difficulty which arises from former physioal theories why
natural productions might not well be thought to be the result of neoessity
rather than teleologioal aotion.

Neoessity finds its own place in

Aristotle'~

own view of nature, but it is only a hypothetioal necessity arising from the
part that matter plays in the oonstitution of natural substanoes. and it subserves the end.

A house. for example. does not come to be because certain of

its materials tend downward to form the foundation and certain others upwar.
to form the roof.

Although the materials and the natural activities attach-

ing to their natures are necessary to the existence of the product by the
very faot that it is a oomposite being. it is not because of them exoept as
the matter that the produot oomes to be.

A house exists for the purpose of

sheltering. and for that end it oomes to be.

If. then, a house is to exist,

the materials and a oertain oontinuous suooession of motions and produotions
must exist until the produot for which they exist and are put into operation
will be realized; for without these anteoedents the end will not be reaohed.
The same kind of neoessity exists in nature; a man, for example. does not
result necessarily from a certain disposition of matter or bodily parts and a

I
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oertain number of natural motions, but if a man is to exist,
essarily exist and produce the man.

these~ust

nec-

Thus Aristotle concludes his argument:

What is neoessary then, is neoessary on a hypothesis; it
is not a result necessarily determinedlby antecedents.
Necessity is in the matter, while 'that for the sake of
which' is in the definition.22
.

••

Aristotle divides natural substanoes into three kinds: the elements
and their oompounds, plants, and animals and their parts, for eaoh of these
is possessed of the internal prinoiple require. of things existing by nature. 23

To all of these kinds belong, in virtue of their forms or natures as

the prinoiple of their movements, proper fUnotions and proper goods; the
actuality at whioh each aims in its aotion is proportioned to the potentiality whioh each possesses by reason of its specifio
belong upward and downward movement in plaoe.

fo~.

To the elements

Movement of any kind, like the

aotion of generation, is never fortuitous; there is no motion of a ohance
subject in a chance direction, but only from one contrary to the other or to
an intermediate state.

"Now, that which produces upward and downward

move~

ment," Aristotle argues, "is that which produoes weight and lightness, and
that which is moved is that which is potentially heavy or light, and the
movement of each body to its own plaoe is motion toward its own form."24

It

is only in the attainment of its proper place that the element has its own
aotuality.

~enever,"

he illustrates, "air comes into being out of water,

light out of heavy, it goes to the upper place.

It is forthwith light: be-

ooming is at an end, and in that plaoe it has being.

Obviously, then, it is

a potentiality, which, in its passage to actuality, oomes into that place and
quantity and quality which belong to its actuality.u25

Thus, the proper form

and end or good that belongs to the elements is accomplished in the place

I
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proper to each. and their natural movements are aimed toward the p}ace.
Bodies compounded out of the elements 26 likewise have movements toward their
place, but their movements are due to their relative lightness or heaviness
arising from the relative proportions of their elementary constituents. 27
When Aristotle turns to the genus ·of' natural things possessed of
life. the same causality of the form as end governs his conception of their
activities.

Living substances in nature are likewise composites of matter

••

and form. namely. of body and soul; and the soul is "the first grade of
actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."28
other words.

i~

The soul. in

the essence or formal cause of the body; for the very being

of the living bodies is to live and "of their being and their living the soul
in them is the cause or source."29 and the aotuality of any potenoy in the
natural order is the fo~.30

But Nature aots for the sake of the end; and

just as the actuality is the end or good of the potentiality, so the soul as
the actuality of the body potential to the soul is the end or good of the
body. 31
It is from the point of view of the end that Ari stotle can thus
treat of the kinds of soul which he distinguishes among living things.

The
I

lowest psyohic power, which belongs to all living things of the earth, "may
be described as that which tends to maintain whatever has this power in it of
continuing such as it was."32 but "since it is right to call things after the
ends they realize. and the end of this soul is to generate another being like
that in Which it is, the first soul ought to be named the reproductive
soul."33

Thus. it is the function of this soul to realize the form of the

living thing in matter by the exercise of its active potentiality for gener-

30

ating; and it is only by reference to this good, namely, the

thing~enerated,

that the reproduotive soul is, "for that which oan make and generate, oonsidered simply as such, exists only in relation to what is made and generat e d • "34

So likewise, the teleol067 appears·in connection with living things
which have the power of local movement.

Sinoe Nature does nothing in vain,

animals must have the power of sensation, must,ossess the next order of
soul, namely, the sensitive; for without it they should be inoapable of
reaching the end whioh Nature has intended for them, that is, to rise to the
oomplete realization of their form in matter and to the exercise of their
potentialities.

It follows, by the same token, that the senses should sub-

serve this good of the animal; and thus they oontribute both to the being and
the well-being of the animal. 35
That ITature

aot~

for a good is the fundamental oonception perVading

the entire physioal system that Aristotle has left; and this view he himself

....

summarizes explicitly with regard to biological scienoe:
At the beginning of the inquiry we must postUlate the prinoiples we are aocustomed constantly to use for our scientific
investigation of nature, that is we must take for granted
principles of this universal character which appear in all
Nature's work. Of these one is that Nature creates nothing
without a purpose, but always the best possible in eaoh kind
of living creature by reference to its essential constitution. Aocordingly if one way is better than another that is
the way of Nature. 36

I
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Chapter V

31

.'

The Ethioal Good
While man possesses in oammon with the elements, plants, and brutes
the funotions proper to them in virtue of th,f'iaot that he shares their natures, he presents a vastly different problem to Aristotle.

For man possess-

es not the mere life of the plants and of the lower animals, but life to a
higher degree.

Alone he has a god-like nature\mose funotion it is to think

and be wise, and "of all living beings with whioh we are aoquainted man alone
partakes of the divine, or at any rate partakes of it in a fuller measure
than the rest."l

For man is differentiated from other natural living sub-

stanoes by the faot that he possesses the rational power of soul which is
more divine than the reproduotive or sensitive and seems, unlike them,
indestruotible and separable from body.

t~

be

If a soul has an aotion or passion

proper to itself alone 2 or if a power of the soul is not the aotuality of any
bodily part,3 it is separable from the body; and, oonversely, if it has no ~
aotion or passion so proper to it or if it is the actuality of a bodily part,
separate existence is impossible to it.

But in the operations of the intel-

leotive soul of knowing in an intelleotual manner Aristotle finds the requirement for separate existenoe: "Insofar as the realities it knows are
oapable of being separated from their matter, so it is also with the powers
of the mind. n4 The intelleotive soul, then, is an independent sUbstanoe
inoapable of destruotion, and for this reason it is more divine than all
other souls, differing from them preoisely as the eternal differs from the
perishable. 5 More preoisely, it is the aoting intellect, whose essential

I
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nature is activity. whioh is separable. impassive. unmixed; "this

~lone

is

immortal and eterna1."6
Thus while man shares in the goods ot the lower substances. the
good proper to man must be a higher good corresponding with man's higher
nature.

Even, however, if the good for man 1s"'a more divine good than that

of any other natural being, it is with the conviction that reason and order
exists in the whole of nature that governs Aristotle's inquiry into the
ethioal good.

•

There must be a ohief good for man. a perfect good which he

desires for its own sake alone and for which he desires everything else;
otherwise the series of goods desirable for the sake of something else would
be infinite, and man's desire would be a vanity.7
a good achievable by action.

This good, then, will be

Aristotle rejeots the Platonic subsistent Idea

of the Good, as far as its contribution to the moral action of man is concerned, preoise1y on the ground that even if it exist separately and independently of all goods that are the object of human desire, it would be
beyond human attainment.

Moreover, even if it were considered as a kind of

pattern by which man could be supposed to be guided in his attainment ot
aotually aohievab1e goods, it is manifestly useless in this regard, as the
I

actual prooedure of the arts attests, and it is diffiou1t to see how it is
possible that the knowledge of a universal Good oou1d be an aid to actions
aiming at partiou1ar goods. 8
The good at whioh man aims must be the most final ot all ends of
action; it must be final without qualification, that is, in no case desirable
for the sake of something else, but always that good for whioh men do whatever they do; in short, it is the good under whioh all goods achievable by
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man are subserved.

It is, moreover, the self-sufficient good

such~hat

alone

it makes human life desirable and laoking no good. 9 To say that this good is
happiness Aristotle finds to be platitudinous.

The question still remains to

determine what the nature of the summum bonum is; and it is by turning to the
function peou1iar to man that he gives his a~c~unt of happiness, just as in
all things which have undergone his scrutiny he has sought the good in their

.

function.

Just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and.
in general, for all things that have a function or activity,
the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function,
so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have
the oarpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions and
aotivities, and has man none? Is he born without a funotion?
Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general eaoh of the parts
evidently has a funotion, may one lay it down that man
similarly has a funotion apart from all these?lO
The peouliar funotion of man is a certain kind of life, sinoe he is a living
being, but neither the life of nutrition and growth, for this is oommon to
all living bodies, nor of peroeption, for this is common to all animals.
Henoe, it is "an aotive life of the element that has a rational principle."
But, "having a rational principle" is applied to the appetitive soul which is
said to "have a rational principle" in the sense of being obedient to one,
I

and to the rational soul whioh possesses one and exeroises thought.

And the

"life of the rational element" oan be understood as the first aotuality or
the seoond aotuality.ll

The function proper to man, Aristotle deoides. is

the proper activity of the rational soul.

But sinoe the rational potenoy is

oapable of contrary effeots,l2 the good for man will reside only in an eminent exeroise of his funotion in respeot of goodness.

If, then, an aotion is

well performed by the exeroise of the human funotion in accordance with the

good appropriate to the funotion, Aristotle ooncludes, the summum

~bnum

is

the "aotivity of soul in aooordance with virtue, and if there are more than
one virtue, in aooordanoe with the best and most complete" exercised "in a
complete life."13
If happiness, then, is an activit;r:n accordance with virtue of the
soul, Aristotle finds it necessary to determine the nature of virtue by reference to the soul itself.

The human soul Aristotle divides into the irra-

•

tional and that which in the primary sense is said to have a rational principle.

The former is divided into the vegetative and that which in a

secondary sense is said to have a rational principle, inasmuch as the
appetitive soul and, in general, the "desiring element" is seen to be
obedient to a rational principle in the continent or temperate or brave man,
although in the incontinent it is allowed to pursue its natural tendenoy
contrary to the rational principle.

As the irrational element can thus be

distinguished from the point of view of its own nature as opposed to the
rational principle and from that of its obedience to the rational, so,
Aristotle finds, can the element having a rational principle primarily be
said to be twofold, "one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in
I

itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father. nl4
In consequence, the virtues corresponding to the parts distinguished in the

rational soul can be divided into two kinds, intellectual and moral.
In respect of the moral virtues, Aristotle determines their genus

as states of character.

Three kinds of things are found in the soul:

passions, faoulties, and such states.

But while men are oalled good or bad

and are praised or blamed beoause of their virtues and vioes, they are not so
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oalled nor is praise or blame imputed of them by reason of either

~eir

passions or their faoulties; and while virtues and vioes involve choioe and
are aoquired by aotion, passions are involuntary and faoulties are in man by
nature.

States of oharacter. on the other hand. are in man as those things

by whioh he stands well or badly with refere~o~ to his passions and actions.
The virtue of anything whatever is that whereby the thing is placed in good
oondition and whereby it exercises its function in an eminent degree.

•

Just

as the proper exoellenoe of an eye or of a horse makes the eye itself to be
good and to see well and the horse to be itself good and to be good at its
fUnotions of running. carrying its rider. and awaiting the enemy in battle,
so the moral virtue of man is a state of the human oharacter that makes him
morally good and that makes him perform his moral aotions and suffer his
passions well.

But as in works of art. exoess and defect destroy the good-

ness of the artefaot, so in human passions and actions;. a man may be ill
disposed toward his passions by feeling them too muoh or too little or he
may. in regard to his aotions. do too much or too little.

Specifically.

then. moral virtue lies in the mean between the vioes of exoess and defect.
Aristotle sums up the nature of moral virtue thus: "Virtue. then. is a state
I

of charaoter oonoerned with choice. lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative
to us, this being determined by a rational prinoiple, and by that prinoiple
by which the man of praotioal wisdom would determine it. nl5
It is in the determination of the rational prinoiple or right rule
whioh presoribes the intermediate to be ohosen that Aristotle is led into a
disoussion of the intelleotual virtues.

Again from the point of view of the

soul he begins and divides the "part whioh grasps a rule or rational
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prinoiple" aooording to the kinds of things with whioh it deals, Lato the
soientifio or oontemplative whioh deals with invariable things and the oaloulative or deliberative which deals with the variable.

The best state of

eaoh of those parts is the virtue of each, and the virtue of eaoh is relative
to its proper funotion; but the best state o~ianything intelleotual is truth.
Although intelleot as suoh does not relate to aotion, the best state of
praotioal intelleot whioh aims at the end of good aotion is truth in agree-

•

ment with right desire; for ohoioe, whioh is the effioient oause of moral
aotion, can be oalled either "desiderative reason or ratiooinative desire."
The proper funotion of both intellectual parts, is, therefore, truth; and
the states whereby eaoh will attain the truth proper to it are the virtues
of each. lS
The state of soul by virtue of which there is truth in the praotioal intelleot insofar as the right aotion of man is concerned Aristotle oalls
praotioal wisdom, which, being neither a state of the oontemplative intelleot
nor the state whioh governs making, is a "true and reasoned state of oapaoity
to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.,,11

This state

involves the ability to deliberate well about what oonduoes to the good life
I

in general; it caloulates with respeot to the means whereby the end of moral
aotions is attained, and this end is the good aotion itself. 18

It is thus

relative to the sphere of moral aotion wherein it oonsiders not only the
universal charaoter of human aotion but partioular goods in view of the highest good and the particular acts whioh must be done to achieve them;19

and

sinoe its end is what ought to be done and what ought not, its offioe is to
issue oommands over the man in the performanoe of virtuous deeds. 20

It is
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not, then, identioal with virtue, but in the good man it is

necess~ily

ooincident with virtue; for Aristotle says, "the work of man is achieved only
in accordanoe with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue
makes us aim at the right mark. and praotioal wisdom makes us take the right
means."21

Thus, it is practioal wisdom whiot ~ormulates the practical syllo-

gism governing the moral aotions of the virtuous man. 22
at which the virtue aims and presoribing the

~ans

•

As knowing the end

Whereby the good is

aohieved, there can be no virtue where there is not practioal wisdom.

For

while the natural faculty of oleverness, which enables the human agent to
aim at and hit the mark, without aoquired virtue to set the right mark may
be employed toward a bad end, and while natural virtue without the direction
of praotical reason is blind and may lead man astray, the acquired moral
virtues and practical wisdom alone guarantees that the agent do virtuous
actions out of established habit and good choice as the man who is without
qualification good would do them.

It is, therefore, evident that choice will

not be right unless practical wisdom and moral virtue are present in the
agent; and it is Aristotle's conclusion that "it is not possible to be good
in the striot sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without
I

moral virtue."23
But the virtue of the oontemplative reason as well enters into
Aristotle's consideration of the highest good for man.

Philosophio wisdom

1s the most finished form of knowledge; for it is a oombination of intuitive
reason, which is the state of mind whioh apprehends first prinoiples,24 and
of soientific knowledge, which is the state or capaoity to demonstrate and
the mental possession of what cannot be otherwise than as it is, namely,
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neoessary and therefore eternal things. 25

It is, moreover, sOientffio knowl-

edge in its most oomplete form inasmuch as it is knowledge of those objeots
whioh are by their nature the highest; and thus philosophio wisdom transoends
even praotioal wisdom whioh in the first place is concerned with man, who,
•

.Q

though he is the best of animals, is still less divine than, for example, the
heavenly bodies, and which, furthermore, is concerned not alone with universals but with particulars also. 26 While it ap~ears, then, that philosophio
wisdom has no oonneotion with those things that will oonduoe to man's happiness in so muoh as its oonoern is not for the things whioh oan be aohieved
by man but for what is eternally what it is,27 Aristotle points out that, in
the first plaoe, even if it oould produoe nothing, it is worthy of ohoioe as
a virtue of the rational soul. 28

But, furthermore, philosophio wisdom does

produoe happiness, not as a produotive art in the way that medioine produoes
health, but as the form of health produoes health in the healthy body; tor
Aristotle says, "being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by
aotualizing itself it makes a man happy."29
It is this oonoeption of the contemplative activity of the soul
whioh forms a seoond view of the nature of the highest good for man. 30

"If

happiness is aotivity in accordance with virtue," he says, reiterating what
he has already established,3l "it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing In us.
Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought
to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and
divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in
us, the aotivity of this in acoordanoe with its proper virtue will be perfeot

I
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happiness. n32

This activity~ he decides, is that of the contempla.ive soul~

and the truly happy life is the oontemplative life.

For it is the contem-

plative activity which most eminently possesses the perfections characteristic of man's highest good.

It is the aotivity of the best element of human

nature exercised on the best knowable objectsfit is the most continuous~ tor
man can oontemplate truth more continously than he

can~

completed by the purest and most enduring pleasures;33

•

anything; it is

it is selt-sufticient

to the extent that the philosopher in oontemplating truth is, ot all men,
least needtul of the company of other men or ot an abundance of worldly
goods; it is most ot all loved for its own sake since nothing is produoed by
contemplation; and it is dependent on leisure and peace tor its best funotion
ing.

It these attributes belong to contemplation and likewise all the other

attributes ascribed to the activity of the happy man who is supremely happy.
it follows that reason exercised in the contemplative activity and allowed a
complete term of life is the oomplete happiness for man. 34
Yet Aristotle, having achieved the end of this

inquiry~

goes on to

say:
But suoh a life would be too high tor man; tor it is not
in so tar as he is man that he will live so~ but in so tar
as something divine is present in him; and by so muoh as
this is superior to our oomposite nature is its aotivity
superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind
ot virtue. If reason is divine, then. in oomparison with
man, the lite according to it is divine in comparison with •
human lite. But we must not tollow those who advise us~
being men. to think of human things, and being mortal~ of
mortal things, but must. so tar as we oan~ make ourselves
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in aocordance
with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk,
muoh more does it in power and worth surpass everything.
This would seem, too. to be each man himself, sinoe it is
the authoritative and better part of him. It would be

I
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strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his .'
self but that of something else. And what we said before
will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by
nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man,
therefore, the life according to reason is best and
p1easantest, since reason more than anything else 1s man.
This life therefore is also the happiest. 35
This being true, only secondarily happy is t~e~life of moral virtue and practical wisdom; but because man is a man, because he has passions arising trom
the lower element ot his composite nature, beoause he needs health, tood, and

•

other attention tor the maintenanoe ot his whole nature, and because he belongs to the society ot men, the activities ot the morally virtuous lite
befit his composite nature and his human estate.

But happiness belongs in

the truest, highest, and most divine sense to the philosopher; the happiness
without qua1itication good for man is the contemplation of truth. 36

I
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Chapter VI
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The Ultimate Good
The concept of analogy which Aristotle employs to explain the faot
that "good" is predicated of the various categories of being serves to unity
.~

goods in the logical order.

Ontologically, the unification of goods is

aohieved by the conception of actuality or the complete reality as the good
which is aimed at in any categorJr; and the sarr~proportion that exists among
the categories of both being and good extends likewise to the actual beings
that fall into them.

In other words, substanoe, prior in being to all the

other oategories, is prior also from the standpoint of good and is that to
whioh both the being and the good of the others are referred.

But another

unity of goods lies in the order of substanoes; for while Aristotle focuses
his attention on the good proper to each substance in the natural order, he
does not allow that the universe as he has painted it with its various distinct goods finds its suffioient reason for attaining the good in the varioda
genera of beings that it comprises.

Matter and form, potency and actuality

as suoh give only a proximate explanation of the activity of all things in
quest of their own good; the ultimate reason lies in a higher aotuality, an
eternal unmoved substanoe from which the final motivation of all things is
derived.
Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of substances comprising the
whole of reality: the movable and perishable sensible substances of the sublunary world, the movable and imperishable sensible substanoes of the heavens, and the immovable and imperishable non-sensible substanoe. l

The exist-

I
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ence of an eternal and unmoved substance he asserts to be

necessa~'if

there

is to be any explanation of movement in the universe of sensible things.
Motion itself is eternal and continuous because time. which is either "the
same thing as movement or an attribute of movement."2 is eternal.

For time

cannot exist or even be thought of apart fro~~he moment whose character it
is to be a kind of middle-point of time, both the end of past time and the
beginning of future time; hence no moment can exist before which there was

•

not time or after which there will be no time. 3
explanation of the perpetuity of motion.

But Aristotle demands an

As far as the first class of sub-

stances is concerned, the sensible substances of the sub-lunary world, the
inquiry deals with the kind of beings whose nature is such that they may
possibly not be; for the fact of generation and destruction in physical
phenomena implies that this substance at one time is and at another time is
not. and hence coming-to-be and passing away belong to the things that "can
be-and-not-be."4
~

The inquiry

into~the

cause of perpetual coming-to-be of this kind

of substance necessitates, however, a distinction of the meanings that may
be attached to "cause" in this connection; for "cause" may refer to the
matter, the for.m, or the "third originative source. u5

I

But insofar as matter

and form are conoerned, while they are neoessary for an adequate explanation
of motion, they fail sufficiently to account for gene ration. 6 An agen~ is
necessary to explain the actualization of matter by for.m; and even if the
latter is taken as the proximate agent which acts to infor.m matter, every
last mover and every last agent, namely, that which is proximate to the moved
or effected thing, imparts motion or acts by being itself moved or by itself
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suffering aotion; it is, in other words, a moved mover or an affected agent,
and needs a further mover or agent to explain its own causal efficaoy.7
What is necessary, then, is the third originative cause whioh, in
one sense of the term,S is the seoond olass of substanoes, the sensible substanoes of the heavens whose movement is primaiy, one, simple, and eternal,
that is, oontinuous looomotion in a circle. 9

In respect of generation and

corruption in the sub-lunary world the oause is the motion imparted by the

•

oombination of the motion of the fixed stars and the motion of the sun suoh
that the sun moVing in an ecliptio path resulting from the motion proper to
it and the motion imparted to it by the first heaven oauses the olass of
things whioh may-or-may-not-be to oome-to-be and pass-away.lO
But the eternal motion of the outer sphere and the sun is not yet
enough; there is required another originative souroe to explain the perpetuity of

mo~ion

of these imperishable things.

nally moved, it requires a mover.
fore also something whioh moves it.

For if the first heaven is eter-

Thus, Aristotle argues: "There is thereAnd sinoe that whioh is mover and moved

is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being
eternal, substanoe, and aotuality.nll

For in any series of motions the
I

oausal virtue exeroised by the last and the intermediate movers is derived
from the oausality imparted by the first mover whioh, in respeot to the
movement in question, must be itself unmoved. l2

But it is only the fi~al

oause or the good whose oausality is that of an unmoved mover, and Aristotle
oonoludes that the unmoved mover whioh is the principle upon whioh the
heavens and the world of nature depend is the good at whioh all things aim.
As the final oause it produoes motion, not by being moved as do the other
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oauses# but by being 10ved. 13

It is not any or every final oause Whioh will

thus explain the tendenoy toward the good in all things, but only the eternal
and unmoved good which Aristotle oalls God.

For every other good and, in

fact, all other goods colleotively are such that they may perish and hence
fail to account for the eternity and oontinult1 of the motion of whioh they
are supposed to be the principles.

As Aristotle argues the point:

The fact that some things become and .others perish, and
that this is so continuously, cannot~e caused by any of
those things that, though they are unmoved# do not always
exist: nor again can it be caused by any of those whioh
move certain partioular things# while others move other
things. The eternity and oontinuity of the process oannot be oaused either by anyone of them singly or by the
sum of them# beoause this oausal relation must be eternal
and neoessary # whereas the sum of these movents is infinite and they do not all exist together. It is olear# then#
that though there may be oountless instanoes of the perishing of some prinoiples that are unmoved but impart motion#
and though many things that move themselves perish and are
sucoeeded by others that oome into being, and though one
thing that is unmoved moves one thing While another moves
another, nevertheless there is something that oomprehends
them all# and that as something apart from eaoh one of
them, and this it is that is the oause of the faot that
some things are and others are not and of the continuous
process of change: and this oauses the motion of the
other movents, while they are the oauses of the motion of
other things. Motion, then, being eternal, the first
movent ••••will be eternal also. 14
I

It is this good at which all things aim and in their striving
account for the perpetual coming-to-be for their good.

Having advanced the

theory that the motion of the first heaven and the sun explain continuBus
generation and corruption, Aristotle turns to the unmoved mover for the
final explanation and says:
And this oontinuity has a suffioient reason on our theory.
For in all things, as we affir.m, Nature always strives
after'the better.' Now 'being' (we have explained else-
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where the exaot variety of meanings we reoognize in this .'
ter.m) is better than 'not-being': but not all things can
possess 'being', sinoe they are too far removed from the
'originative souroe.' God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfeotion of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible ooherenoe would thus be seoured to existenoe,
beoause that 'ooming-to-be should ~t~elf come-to-be perpetually' is the olosest approxima~i~n to eternal being. 15
No less evident is the same view when Aristotle turns to the generative soul
in living beings:
The aots in whioh it manifests itself are reproduotion and
the use of food-reproduction, I say, beoause for any living
thing that has reached its normal development and whioh is
unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural aot is the produotion of another like
itself, an animal produoing an animal, a plant a plant, in
order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in
the eternal and divine ••••• Since then no living thing is
able to partake in what is eternal and divine by uninterrupted continuance (for nothing perishable oan for ever
remain one and the same), it tries to achieve that end in
the only way possible to it, and suocess is possible in
varying degrees; so it remains not indeed as the selfsame individual but continues its existence in something
~ itself -- not numerically but specifioally one. IS
And, again, as to the mode of this imitation of the divine in the case of
animal generation he sums up his position:
Now (1) some existing things are eternal and divine whilst
others admit of both existenoe and non-existenoe. But (2)
that which is noble and divine is always, in virtue of its
own nature, the cause of the better in suoh things as admit
of being better or worse, and what is not eternal does admit,of existenoe and non-existenoe, and oan partake in the
better and the worse.' And (3) soul is better than body,
and the living, having soul, is thereby better than the
lifeless which has none, and being is better than not-being,
living than not living. These, then, are the reasons of the
generation of animals. For since it is impossible that suoh
a class of things as animals should be of an eternal nature,
therefore that which oomes into being is eternal in the only
way possible. Now it is impossible for it to be eternal as
an individual (though of course the real essence of things

I
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is in the individual) -- were it suoh it would be eternal.-but it is possible for it as a speoies. 17
Thus it appears that the universal aiming at the final good whioh is the
unmoved mover is at onoe the aiming of every being at its own good; the
striving for participation in the eternal and divine good is preoisely only

••

another side of the striving of eaoh thing for the aotuality or the good
proper to its own potentiality.

When Aristotle says that "not all things oan

possess 'being' sinoe they are too far removed irom the 'originative souroe'.'
he is stating 6 though in a somewhat infrequent mode of expression. the exaot
differenoe he finds between substances which are imperishable, henoe eternal
and divine 6 and substanoes whioh are perishable.

It is the latter which are

oontingent and henoe only potentially existent, and on this basis Aristotle
finds himself able to argue the priority of actuality over potentiality "in a
stricter sense" even than on the basis of actuality as the end of potentiality.lS

For the eternal thing is in respect of its substanoe imperishable and

oonsequently is in the full sense nOlpotential to not being. whereas the
potentiality of the perishable thing affects its very sUbstanoe. 19

~

In oon-

sequenoe, this kind of substance oan never attain to the "being" whioh oharaoterizes the things whioh are eternal; for the degree in whioh they are
actual, always implying the potentiality for substantial destruction. they
are distantly removed from the degree in whioh the eternal Doriginative
souroes" are aotual.

.

The degrees, then, in whioh they may imitate the actu-

ality of the eternal substanoe is proportioned to the measure in which they
realize the potentialities proper to their own natures, and this imitation is
consequently the realization of their good by the exercise of their proper
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funotions.

The "being" or the aotuality for which all things

stri~.

the

good at which they aim. oan thus be realized in only an approximation to the
eternal aotuality and the eternal good.

The ultimate aotuality and the

ultimate good is eternal; but the eternity whioh it is possible tor natural
substanoes to achieve is only the eternity or the species tor the very reason
that individually each natural is one "whose 'substanoe' is suoh that it is
essentially oapable of not-being."20
The oase is perhaps less clear with regard to the highest good at
whioh all men aim, but in last analysis it is nonetheless the same.

The

aotualization of man's highest potenoy is the activity of the contemplative
life, and this above all is the exeroise of the intelleotual function proper
to man.

It is no less an approximation to the eternal actuality; and just as

all other beings strive toward the eternal good by the exercise of their
proper funotions. so must man. as far as he oan. strive toward immortality by
"straining every nerve" to live in aooordanoe with the divinest element in
him. his oontemplative soul by "thinking and being wise."

For this is the

activity of God,2l the most blessed and happiest of all things, who has no
need of moral virtue sinoe the oiroumstances ot virtuous aotion are trivial
I

and unworthy ot divinity.

"The aotivity of God, whioh surpasses all others

in blessedness, must be oontemplative; and of human aotivities, therefore,
that whioh most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness."~2

And

the life of the oontemplative man is thus the highest imitation of God possible to the perishable beings of the earth:
He who exercises his reason and oultivates it seems to be
both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods.
For if the gods have any oare for human affairs, as they
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are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that the¥
should delight in that whioh is best and most akin to them
(i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love
and honor this most, as caring for the things that are dear
to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all
these attributes belong most of all to the philosopher is
manifest. He, therefore. is the dearest to the gods. And
he who is that will presumably be also the happiest; so
that in this wa~ too the philosoph8~ill more than any
other be happy. 3
It is thus that in the first and eternal good Aristotle unifies the
striving of every individual being in the

uni~se.

for it is in the striving

to realize the perfeotion of their own natures that the neoessary and eternal
divinity is their aim.

But the unity of the goods under the unmoved mover

implies a further unity of goods among themselves. for Aristotle feels at
least that the desire of all things for the highest good oonduces to the
good of the ensemble of natural things:
We must consider also in whioh of two ways the nature of
the universe oontains the good and the highest good. whether as something separate and by itself. or as the order of
the parts. Probably in both ways. as an army does; for its
good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more
in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it
depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike, -- both fishes and fowls and plants;
and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do
with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered
together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the
freemen are least at liberty to act at random. but all
things or most things are already ordained for them, while
the slaves and the animals do little for the common good,
and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort
of prinoiple that oonstitutes the nature of each. I mean,
for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved
into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in whioh all share for the good of the whole. 24
Only in the last good, then, does Aristotle find reason in the whole universe, in the order manifested in the aiming of all things at their proper
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and proximate actuality or good and in the adaptation ot beings to ene
another.

Even it it is only the tact that the corruption ot one substance

is the generation of another. 25 the order inherent in the nature ot things
is apparent.

Thus it is that the end and the good for which all beings are

destined to strive furnishes the last angwer~~the problem or the good in
the philosophy or Aristotle.

•
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All quotations and references are from The Works of Aristotle
Translated into English under the edito~ip of W:-D. Ross,
Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Chapter I
1.

Ethioa Nichomachea I,

2.

Categoriae v. 2 a 11-12.

3.

ib. 2 a 34.

4.

ib. 2 a 13-18.

5.

ib. 2 b 15-16. Aristotle does not restrict the charaoteristio of
individuality to primary substances alone, for suoh things as a
oertain point of gramr~tioal knowledge in the mind or a oertain
whiteness inhering in its proper subjeot are likewise individual.
Categ. ii, 1 a 9, 25-29. But these individual qualifications
enter the Categoriae apparently only to fill out the scheme of
things present in or not present in a subject and or predicable
of or not predioable of a subject. Since they are singulars they
are henceforth neglected. Their individuality causes no confusion
with substanoes inasmuch as they require a subject.

6.

Metaphysica VII, xiii, 1038 b 8-14. Roman numerals will be used
throughout to designate the books of the Metaphysics, counting
as book II such that there will be fourteen books in all.

7.

ib. b 15.

8.

ib. b 36-37. Even secondary substanoes, or the species and genera,
indicate a quality, but nwith reference to a substance." Categ. v,
3 b 19. cf. Met. III, vi, 1003 a 7-8; De Sophisticis Elenohis xxii,
178 b 38-l79-a-lO. Aristotle devotes the remainder ot Met. VII,
xiii to further arguments fram the point of view of ma1c:Iiig species
or genera primary substanoes, with the P1atonio viewpoint in mind
explicitly and VII, xiv entire to the critioism of the Ideas in
light of them. In sum, they come to the argument of Met. III, vi,
1003 a 9-11: "If we are to allow that a common predicate is a 'this'
and a single thing, Soorates will be several animals -- himself and
'man' and 'animal', if each of these indioates a 'this' and a single thing." But since the Good would not be considered as a species
or genus of substanoe, these arguments are not to our purpose.

9.

i~

1094 a 1-3.

Met. VII, xvi, 1040 b 23-27.

And if being and unity are not sub-
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stanoes by reason of their universality, a fortiori neither !s any
other universal; for being and unity, as "attributes that follow
everything," are the most universal of terms.
10.
11.

Met. I, ix, 990 b 30.
Met. VII, xvi, 1040 b 28. of. XIII. x, 1086 b 16-19: "If we do not
substanoes to be separate, and in the way in whioh individual things are said to be separate, we Shall destroy substanoe in
the sense in whioh we understand ·substanoe'." Aristotle says that
the Platonists "gave separate existenoe to these universally predicated substanoes, so that it followed that universals and individuals were almost the same sort of thing." XIII, ix. 1086 b 10-11 •

~pose

•

12.

!!!.

13.

To the argument that a universal indicates only a "such" (vide p. 50,
n. 8) Aristotle adds that otherwise, that is, if it were taken to
indicate a "this", "many difficulties follow and especially the
'third man'." 1039 a 2. The reference is to the usual objections
to the "one-over-many" prooedure of the Platonio dialeotic and to
his own summary oriticism in~. I, ix.

14.

This is Aristotle's thought not in so many words in Categ. v.,
where, as regards seoondary substance, the species is considered
to be "more truly substantial" than the genus for the reason that
the latter, being too general, is further removed from the primary
substanoe. 2 b 6-14.

15.

Categ. v, 2 b 28-37.

I, ix, 991 b 1-3.

Chapter II
1.

Aristotle notes parenthetioally. "whioh is the reason why they did
not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers." Cf.
Met. XIII. vi. on the various forms the number theory took in the
Acedemy. The reason is obscure; but in his short history of the
origin of the theory of the Ideas Aristotle points out that while
Soorates for the first time employed induction from particulars to
a universai, Plato, with his Heraclitean distrust of changing sensible things. gave separate existence to"the universals or the
definitions" of Soorates, so that it followed for him "almost by
the same argument" that there was a sUbsistent one-over-many not
only of the ethical oonoepts of Soorates but of all things spoken
of universally in whioh the individuals were said to partioipate.
He notes that "partioipation" is only another name for the Pythagorean "imitation of n~bers" and that while the Pythagoreans
made all things numbers. Plato made his entities separate beoause
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of "his inquiry in the region of definitions" (Met. I. vi. 9a7 b 32)
and. with referenoe to the Platonist in general:-Deoause of the
"abstraot oharaoter of their inquiry." (Met. XII. i, 1069 a 28) It
would seem. then. that the oharaoter of definitions whioh the universals possessed was the reason why the Platonists would not admit
priority and posteriority in the predication of the substantialized
Ideas. for the definition is always univooal. The writer of the
Eudemian Ethios is more explioit; he prefaces his criticism of the
Platonic Good with the remark that a distussion of the Ideas belongs
for the most part to logioal inquiry beoause it inVolves the relationship of the universal term and the individuals of whioh it is
predicated. (I, viii, 1217 b 16-19) The burden of the oritioism in
both works is, oonsequently, from the standpoint of predioation •
2.

3.

•

Aristotle uses for the purposes of illustration only the oategories
of substanoe and relation inasmuoh as relation provides him with the
most obvious example of posterior being. Relation is, he remarks
parenthetioally here, "like an aooident and offshoot of being." 1096
a 12. Elsewhere he says more emphatioally. apropos to the indefinite
dyad of the great and the small, "what is relative is least of all
things a kind of entity or substanoe, and is posterior to quantity
and quality." Cf. Met. XIV, i, 1088 a 22-23, where substanoe. quantity, quality, and relation are taken apparently as exhaustive of
the oategories.
Eth. Nio. I, vi. 1096 a 17-29. Aristotle adds other oritioisms whioh
oonoern us here: that a single idea of the Good would neoessitate a single soienoe of the good; that "good-in-itself" and "this
good" would not be different in the respeot that they are good; that
the eternity of the good is not argument for its betterness; that,
~
insofar as the ethioal good is oonoerned, the Ideal Good would not
be aohievable; and that, insofar as the aotual prooedure of the
soienoes is oonoerned, neither do they regard it as a pattern to aid
them in aohieving their aotually attainable goods, whioh is an improbable state of affairs if suoh a pattern does exist, nor does it
seem probable that it should be an aid sinoe they are oonoerned with
partioulars. He also answers a supposed distinotion oounter to his
oritioism, i.e. that goods are either those pursued for their own
sake or those pursued as useful to them; for it is evident that even
those goods whioh are oommonly pursued for their own sake differ in
respeot of their goodness and henoe could not fall into a single.
class of whose individuals good would be univooally predioated, and
that if the Idea of the Good is alone good per se, it would be
empty, that is, it oould contribute nothing to partioular goods.
1096 a 29-1097 a 14.

~not

4.

lb. 1096 all.

5.

lb. 1096 b 27-31.
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6.

Aristotle ohooses "quality" as exemplifying the likeness.

7.

Cf. Categ. i, 1 a 1-15 on univooal and equivooal names.

8.

Met. IV, ii, 1003 b 6-10; of. VII, i, 1028 a 9-b 2; iv, 1030 a 21-27,
a-33-b 3; IV, 1003 a 32-b 6; for the enumeration of the oategories ot.
V, vii, 1017 a 23-30; Categ. ii-ix.

9.

Not univooally, as his critioism of P~~ has indioated (vide supra,
pp. 5-6, nor equivocally beoause it does not belong to things "which
chance to have the s~e name." vide supra, p. 6.)

Chapter III
1.

~.

2.

lb. vii, 988 b 6.

3.

lb. ix, 992 a 30.

4.

~.

5.

It was because thinkers could not entrust the goodness and beauty
which things manifest in their being and becoming to matter or to
chance and spontaneity that they were at length "torced by the truth
itself" to inquire into some cause other than the material. Met.
•
I, iii, 984 b 8-15. On chance and spontaneity, vide intra, PP:-24-25.

6.

ct.

I, iii, 983 a 32.

V, xvii, 1022 a 8. ot. Ph~Sioa II, ii, 194 a 30-33, Where he
critioises the pun on "end", " or not every stage that is last
claims to be an end, but only that which is best." ct. also Met.
V, xvi, 1021 b 28.

Met. V, i "Beginning". Here Aristotle oalls the tinal oause a
"beginning", for ·"the good and the beautiful are the beginning both
ot the knowledge and of the movement of many things." 1013 a 23.
He does not say the movement of all things, for he keeps in mind
the movements initiated by chanoe-ind spontaneity ot whioh the good,
as the result aimed ~, oannot be oalled the beginning.

7.

~.

8.

lb. ii, 1013 b 26-27.

9.

Phys. II, iii, 195 a 23-25.

V, xvi, 1021 b 24.

10.

!!!.

11.

~.~.

I, ii, 982 b 4-10.
I, ii, 1094 a 27-b 11.
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Cf. also Phys. II, ii, 194 a 38-b 8.

.'

12.

lb. 1094 a 10-15.

13.

Met. III, ii, 996 b 1-12

14.

Met. III, i1, 996 a 22-28. The same argument is repeated in XI, i,
1059 a 35-39 where it is reiterated that the final oause or the
nature of the good is found "in the field of action and movement,"
and that it is the nature of the end to be a first mover whereas
"in the case of things unmovable there~!' nothing that moved them
first. "

15.

~.

16.

lb. 991 a 19-21.

17.

Met. V, xxiv.

18.

Met. I, ix, 991 a 21-26.

19.

lb. 992 a 24-26.

20.

"The proximate prinoiple of all things are the 'this' which is
proximate in aotuality, and another whioh is proximate in potentiality. The universal oauses, then, of whioh we spoke [soil.
matter form, privation, and agent] do not exist. For in regard
to the last mentioned oause it is the individual whioh is the
originative prinoiple of the individuals. For while man is the
originative prinoiple of man universally, there is no universal
man, but Peleus is the originative prinoiple of Aohilles, and
your father of you, and this partioular b of this partioular ba,
though b in general is the originative prinoiple of ba taken -without-qualifioation •••• and those oauses of things in the same
speoies are different, not in speoies, but in the sense that the
oauses of different individuals are different, your matter and
form and moving oause being different from mine." Met. XII, v,
1071 a 18-29. This is not explioitly an argument against the
Platonists, but its implioations are relevant.

I, ix, 990 b 1-9; 992 a 28.

21.

In regard to things said to share in Ideas, cf. Met. I, ix, 991 b 3-9;
in regard to substanoes, Met. VII, iii, 1033 b 25-1034 a 8; in regard
to natural objeots, Met. XII, iii, 1070 a 18-30; in regard to t~ngs
that oome-to-be, of.-n8 Generatione et Corruptione II, ix, 335 b 10-15,
18-24.
---

22.

Aristotle here merely points out that "this argument, whioh first
Anaxagoras and later Eudoxus and oertain others used, is very
easily upset; for it is not diffioult to oollect many insuperable
objeotions to suoh a view." ~. I, ix, 991 a 16-18.
A "oomposition" in the sense in whioh Aristotle uses the term to
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describe the Anaxagorean theory of the unity of a subject an~'its
qualifioation is, loosely speaking, a mixture. To be a composition
the component parts must be aotually present in the whole in their
own identity and separable from the whole. This is the oharacteristio of the homoeomeries, although Aristotle notes that Anaxagoras
held that complete separation will not take plaoe. But he says in
oriticism: "The statement that complete separation will never take
place is correot enough, though Anaxag9F~S is not fully aware of
what it means. For affectations are i~deed inseparable. If then
oolors and states had entered into the mixture, and if separation
took plaoe, there would be a 'white' or a 'healthy' whioh was nothing
but white or healthy, i.e. was not the predicate of a subject."
PhIs. I, iv, 188 a 5-9. That Aristotle would consider this criticism
va id enough against any theory which wo~d place the Ideas in things
by way of composition is clear.
.--23.

Vide supra, p. 10.So Aristotle goes on to say that the "modern
thinkers" have identified mathematics with philosophy -- for the
reason, no doubt, that there is no final cause among mathematical
entities inasmuch as there is no motion.

24.

Met.

XII, x, 1075 a 38-39.

25.

Met.

I, vii, 988 b 6-16.

26.

For incidental causality, cf.

27.

Met. XII, x, 1075 b 18-19. Although Aristotle mentions only a
"superior principle", we inter from the context, i.e. the summary
examination of the role of the good in other philosophers, that he
means the final oause. It is not very likely that he would allow
the proximate agent at least to be superior to the proximate form
in any oausality, and he oan hardly be unaware of the transcendent
character given to the Idea of the Good by Plato; he must, therefore, have in mind a principle superior even to the Good in its
causality. For the point of the argument is that even if the
Platonists posit the Good as a principle of the participating and
the ooming-to-partioipate of things in the Ideas, the Good is no
less an Idea than the others and, in this muoh at least, ie not
superior to them in the mode of causality whioh the Ideas are said
to exercise. It would be required, then, that a superior principle
explain why things that are called good participate and oome-toparticipate in the Good.

28.

Met.

IX, i, 1046 a 11-12.

29.

Met.

V, xii, 1019 a 15-20.

30.

Met.

IX, i, 1046 a 4-28.

~.

V, ii, 1013 b 34-1014 a 6.

Aristotle likewise distinguishes between
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rational and non-rational potencies of acting. Rational pote»eies
belong only to those living beings which are possessed of the rational part of the soul, whereas non-rational potenoies belong also to
non-living things whioh laok the rational soul. ~~, 1046 a 37-b 3.
The difference between the two is that the latter is capable of producing only a single effect; and, moreover, when the being possessing
the non-rational potency meets the agent in the manner appropriate
to the potency, it is neoessary that the. agent act and the patient
suffer. The former, however, is capabre~of produoing contrary
effects, as the agent possessing the medical art, for example, can
produce both disease and health; and the agent is not determined to
produce its effects when the object upon which it can act is present,
for, since the effects are oontraries, it would produce contrary
effects at the same time. In this case, ·tn additional determinant,
desire or will, is required to decide which of the two effeots is
to be produoed. v, 1047 b 35-1048 all.
31.

Ib. vi, 1048 a 32.

32.

lb. 1048 a 25-b 8.

33.

Which "in a sense" is the most fundamental point of view from which
"prior" and "posterior" are considered. ct. Met. V, xi, esp. 1019
all; comp. Categ. xii, 14 a 29-34.

34.

Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 4-10.

35.

Vide supra, p. 17. For the form as end, vide infra, p.23.

36.

Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 31-34.

37.

Ib. vi, 1048 b 25-28.

38.

lb. viii, 1050 a 23.
I

Chapter IV
1.

Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 16-19. For the senses in which a thing is said
to be in another, of. Phys. IV, iii, 210, a 15-24; as in its good or
its end, a 22-23.
-

2.

Meteoro1ogica

3.

~.

4.

Cf. De Caelo II, iii, 268 a 8: "Everything which has a function exists
for its function."

IV, xii, 390 a 10-19.

IX, viii, 1049 b 9.
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5.

ihYS. II, i, 192 b 22-23. By adding the qualification "in vi,rtue of
tself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" Aristotle in one
stroke excludes artificial things from the sphere of the natural and
chanoe and spontaneity from being natural oauses. Artifioia1 things
aot and suffer action, but they aot and suffer not in virtue of what
they are as artificial things but in virtue of the natural bodies of
whioh they are oomposed and which as suoh are merely ooncomitent to
artifioial things as suoh. A bed, for ,instanoe, might sprout if it
were planted or it may be burned, but·oftly in virtue of the aotive
and passive potencies, respeotively, of the wood of which it is made.
For "incidental oauses" of. Met. V, ii, 1013 b 30-1014 a 6; Phys. II,
ii, 195 a 33-b 11. For ohance-and spontaneity, vide infra, p~4-25.

6.

For the most oomplete enumeration and extlioation of the various
senses of "nature" of • .!!:!:.. V, iv.

7.

Ph{S. II, i, 193 b 7-8. On the expression "to be what it is" of.
Me • V, iv, 1014 b 35-1015 a 11-12: "'Nature' means the essenoe of
natural objects ••••• By an extension of meaning from this sense of
'nature' every essenoe in general has oome to be called a 'nature',
beoause the nature of a thing is one kind of essenoe."

8.

9.

Met. V, iv, 1015 a 5, in respeot of the "primary and striot" sense
i.e. form or essence.

~nature",

lb. 1015 a 16.

10.

Phys.

11.

Vide supra, p. 18.

12.

II, vii, 198 a 25-29.

Cf. Phys. I, ix, where matter is said to "desire" the form. This
oannot be taken apart from its oontext. Aristotle
here is purposively using the language which the Platonism he is
critizing suggests to him.
Admitting with them [scil. the Platonists] that there is
something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there
are two other prinoiples, the one contrary to it [scil.
the privation of the form], and the other [scil. mattetj
such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it.
But the consequenoe of their view is that the contrary
desires its own distinotion. Yet the form cannot desire
itself, for it is not defeotive; nor oan the contrary
desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The
truth is that what desires the form is the matter, as the
female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful -- only
the ugly or the female not per!! but l!! aocidens. 192 a
17-24.

mode~expression

I

58
The point last made is that the ugly and the female relative ~o the
beautiful and the male are inoomplete realizations of the form inits matter and henoe desire the latter as the inoomplete may be said,
in general, to desire oompletion or that which has the full reality
of its speoies; but they desire not as things whose very nature is
to be incomplete, but as things whioh are per aooidens inoomplete in
the sense of being defioient in the respeot of the exoellence proper
to the species. Cf. Met. V, xvi, passim. esp. 1021 b 15-17. Matter,
on the other hand, as-raoking any detefm~nation, is per se inoomplete
and henoe desires the form by its very nature.
----xvii, 1041 a 31-32.

13.

~.VII,

14.

Phys. II, vii, 198 b 9.

15.

Phy;s. II, v-vi.

16.

lb. viii, 198 b 33-199 a 8.

17.

De Gen. et Cor. II, vi, 333 b 5-15.

18.

lb. 333 b 19.

19.

~.

20.

The parallelism is so striot that Aristotle even ventures to say that
if the produots of art were made by nature or if natural produots were
made by art, the prooess by whioh either aooomplishes its end would
remain the same. Phys. II, viii, 199 a 13-15.

21.

Phys. II, viii, 199 a 26-33.

22.

lb. ix, 200 a 13-14; of. De Part. Anim. I, i, 639 b 21ff. The reason
why simple or absolute necessity is-eioluded from nature and from art
is that the produots of nature and art are suoh that they mayor may
not be. Absolute neoessity wherein the oonsequent follows neoessarily
from the anteoedent, as well as oonversely, ooours only in eternal
things where it is absolutely neoessary that the oonsequent be. It
would be only on the assumption that a man or a house must oome to
be that either should neoessarily result from the proper disposition
of the matter in whioh they are realized. Cf • .£!~. ~.£2!.. II,
xi, 337 b 10-338 b 6.

VII, vii, 1032 a 25-b 24;

De Partibus Animalium I, i, 639 b 17-32

23.

Phys. II, i, 192 b 9-23.

24.

De Caelo IV, iii, 310 a 32-b 1. Thus fire moves toward the upper
plaoe and earth toward the lower, and at the end of the movement
the upper and lower plaoes belong respectively to eaoh, for the
reason that suoh movement is the aotualization of a proper paten-
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tiality at the completion of which the proper end is attaine~; just
as the healable, Aristotle illustrates, when moved attains health
and not a greater bulk. For the moat part, the examples he chooses
are drawn from art, but he notes the difference. That which can be
healed qua healable needs ordinarily an agent other than itself;
but the elements, a propos to the example in question, have the
source of their movement, the actualization of their potenoies,
within themselves. "The reason," Ari~to~le remarks, "why the heavy
and the light appear more than these t'h:i?!gs to contain wi thin themselves the source of their movements is that their matter is nearest
to being. This is indioated by the faot that looomotion belongs to
bodies only when isolated from other bodies, and is generated last
out of the several kinds of movement; in order of being then it will
be first." lb. IV, iii, 310 b 32-311 a ~.
25.

De Caelo IV, iii, 311 a 1-6. Cf. De Gen. et Cor. II, viii: "Eaoh of
them tends to be borne toward its OW'n-prace: but the 'figure' -- i.e.
the 'form' -- of them all is at the limits." 335 a 20-22.

26.

Every compound is oomposed of all the elementary bodies.
et Cor. II, viii, passim.

27.

It is enough to explain the movements of their unoompounded parts in
order to understand the movements of the oompounds. Cf. De Cae10 IV,
ii, 309 b 20-21; iv, 311 a 30-35.

28.

E!Anima II, i, 412 a 29.

29.

lb. iv, 415 b 13.

30.

lb. 415 b 14.

31.

lb. 415 b 15-20.

32.

lb. 416 b 18.

33.

lb. 416 b 23-25. Cf. De Caelo, II, xiv: "It is right to oa1l anything that which nature-intends it to be and which belongs to it,
rather than whioh it is by oonstraint and oontrary to nature," 297
b 22-23.

34.

~

35.

£! Anima,

36.

De Inoessu Anima1ium, ii, 704 b 11-17

Cf.

£!~. ~.

Cf. De Gen.

I, v, 645 b 14-19.
I

Generatione Animalium, II, vi, 742 a 30-32.
III, xii, 434 a 30-435 a 10.

.'

Chapter V
1.

De Part. Anim. II, x, 656 a 8-9.
Anim. II,-rrr, 736 b 28.

2.

E!~.

Cf. IV, x, 686 a 29-30 J
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E.!~.

I, i, 403 a 10-11.

lb. II, i, 413 a 3-7.
4.

lb. III, iv, 429 b 22-23.

5.

lb. I, iv, 408 b 18-29;

6.

lb. III, v, 430 a 23. The immortality atd eternity whioh Aristotle
finds thus to belong to the aoting power of the human soul is the
reason he speaks of it as "divine" or "more divine" than any other
soul; for the term "divine" to the Greeks was applied to anything
aocording to the relative long lastingness of its life. Aristotle
himself points out this usage: "All.men have some conoeption of the
nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existenoe of gods at
all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting the highest
plaoe to the deity, surely because they suppose that immortal is
linked with immortal and regard any other supposition as inoonoeivable." De Caelo 1, iii, 270 b 6-9. "This word 'duration' possessed
a divine-Signifioanoe for the anoients, for the fulfillment whioh
includes the period of life of any oreature, outside of whioh no
natural development oan fall, has been oalled duration. On the
same prinoiple the fulfillment of the whole heaven, the fulfillment
whioh inoludes all time and infinity, is 'duration' -- a name based
upon the the faot that it is always -- duration immortal and divine ....
I, ix, 279 a 23-28. "The anoients gave to the Gods the heaven or
upper plaoe, as being alone immortal." II, i, 284 a 12. "The
aotivity of God is immortality, i.e. eternal life." II, iii, 286

II, ii, 413 b 24-29.

a 9.

7.

Eth. Nio. 1, ii, 1094 a 18-22. Cf. Met. V for the impossibility of
an-infinite series of final oauses, ii, 994 a 8-9, b 9-16.

8.

~.~.

9.

I,

vi~

1096 b 32-1097 a 14.

lb. vii, 1097 a 24-b 21.

10.

lb. vii, 1097 b 25-32.

11.

Although oalling it the "aotive life" identifies it as seoond
aotuality, i.e. the exercise of the rational potency. Vide
supra, pp. 18-20.

12.

Vide supra, p. 16, n. 30.
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13.

Eth. Nic. I, vii, 1097 b 23-1098 a 19. Aristotle insists that
happiness is an "aotivity" of the soul because aotivity or action
denotes "life" in its more proper sense. 1098 a 7. For activity
as the proper sense of actuality, vide supra, pp.18-20.
When Aristotle turns to find his own view in harmony with that of
others he conoludes likewise that happiness is aotivity. Goods
relating to soul are properly and most truly goods) for while he
agrees with the Pythagorean and P1ato~~division of goods into
external goods, those of the body, and those of the soul, the
identifioation of happiness with "oertain aotions and aotivities"
allows the good for man to fall among goods of the soul rather than
any other olass. viii, 1098 b 12-19. Moreover, the happy man is
thought to live well and do well, and ha,piness must thus be a good
living and a good aotion. 1098 b 20-22. Further, if the ohief good
is plaoed merely in a state of mind, it is conoeivable that it may
exist without produoing any good aotion at all, as when a man is
asleep or otherwise inaotive; whereas one possessing happiness will
aot and aot well by the very faot that it is itself an aotivit,y and
the best for man. 1098 b 30-1099 a 6.

14.

lb. xiii, 1103 a 3.

15.

lb. II, ii, 1106 b 36-1107 a 2.

16.

lb. VI, i-ii, 1188 a 35-1139 b 13.

17.

lb. iv, 1140 b 5"'6, 20.

18.

lb. 1140 b 7.

19.

lb. vii, 1141 b 15.

20.

lb. x, 1143 a 8.

21.

lb. xii, 1144 a 7-9.

22.

lb. 1144 a 30-35.

23.

lb. xiii, 1144 b 30-31.

24.

lb. vi, 1140 b 31-1141 a 8.

25.

lb. iii, 1139 b 19-35.

26.

lb. vii, 1141 a 12-b 23.

27.

lb. xii, 1143 b 18-20, where this is advanoed as an objeotion and
diffiou1ty.

I

Cf. Aualytica Posteriora

I, ii, 71 b 9-15.
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28.

lb. 1144 a 1-3.

29.

lb. 1144 a 5-6. That is, as a rational potenoy whose aotualization
is in the exercise of the aotivity itself. Vide supra., pp. 18-20.

30.

There are apparently two views of the happy life in the Ethica
Niohomaohea, the life of praotioal wisdom and the life of
philosophic wisdom, of which Aristotle holds that the latter is
the higher. The politioal philosophef" m, oalls the "arohiteot of
the end, with a view to which we oall one thing bad and another
good without qualification." VII, xi, 1152 b 2-3. But praotica1
wisdom is not supreme over philosophio, for "to maintain its
supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the
gods beoause it issues orders about all -the affairs of the state."
VI, xiii, 1145 a 10-11.
In neglecting the problem of reoonoi1ation of the two 1ives, our
disoussion may appear to be an over-simp1ifioation; but this
problem does not fall within the soope of our treatment of the
good.

31.

Vide supra, p.32.

32.

Eth. Nio. X, vii, 1177 a 12-18.

33.

Pleasure, to Aristotle, is the oompletion of an activity, "as an end
whioh supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower
of their age;" and as long as the faoulty exeroising the aotivity is
in its proper condition, its proper pleasure is involved in its
fulfillment. Cf. Eth. Nic. X, iv, passim. esp. 1174 b 15-1175 a 3. M
Pleasures differ a~rding to the aotivities of whioh they are the
oompletion, and they are superior in the measure that their aotivities
are superior. Cf. X, v, passim. esp. 1175 b 36-1176 a 3.

34.

lb. X, vii, 1177 a 12-b 25.

35.

lb. 1177 b 26-1178 a 8.

36.

lb. X, viii, passim.

Chapter VI
1.

Met. XII, i, 1069 a 30-b 2; vi, 1071 b 3. This olassification
corresponds to the division of things in the world into those
whioh are always motionless, those always in motion, and those
whioh admit of both motion and rest, the establishment of whioh
is the oore of the argument of Phys. VIII, iii-ix.

I

63
~he

2.

Met. vi, 1071 b 9. Cf. Phys. VIII, i, where time is either
number of motion or itse~ kind of motion." 251 b 12.

3.

Phys. VIII, i, 251 b 10-28. other arguments in the same place: to
say-that motion had a beginning is to say that some ohange existed
before the first ohange that would have brought either the mover or
the movable into the particular oondition requisite to effect the
first ohange; and to say that motion ~~l have an end is to say that
some ohange will exist after the lastohAnge, for the last destructive
agent itself will have to be destroyed. 251 a 8-252 a 4. The view
that motion is not eternal is nothing less than "fantastic."

4.

De Gen. et Cor. II, ix, 335 a 33-b 5.

5.

De Gen. et Cor. II, x, 335 a 28-32.

The last oause enumerated here
in a similar distinction
in I, iii, where the context is limited to the discussion of the same
question from the point of view of the material oause alone. It is
oalled "the source trom which, as we say, the process originates."
318 a 1. In a 4-5 it is distinguished into something immovable
through all time, the discussion of whioh Aristotle defers to the
Metaphysics, and something always moved, which he leaves to the
oontext we are now oonsidering.

is givenasasecond cause along with matter

6.

They "are not suffioient to bring things into being."

7.

De Gen. et Cor. I, vii, 324 a 25-34.

8.

Cf. n.5, supra.

9.

~.

XII, vi, 1071 b 10-11.
~

Gen.

lb. 335 a 32.

Cf. Phys. VIII, v, passim.

Cf. Phys. VIII, vii-ix on suoh movement.

~~.

10.

lb. 1072 a 9-18;

II, x, 336 a l5-b 24.

11.

lb. vii, 1072 a 23-25.

12.

Cf. Phys. VIII, v, for the oomplete development of this argument.

13.

~.

14.

Phls. VIII, vi, 258 b 27-259 a 8.

15.

De Gen. et Cor. II, x, 336 b 27-35.

16.

~

Anima II, iv, 415 a 25-b 7.

17.

De

~. ~.

18.

Vide supra, p. 17.

I

XII, vii, 1072 b 1-4.

II, i, 731 b 24-37.

.'
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19.

~.

20.

Cf.

21.

Cf.~.

22.

~.~.

23.

lb. 1179 a 23-32.

24.

~.

25.

Cf. De Gen. at Cor. I, iii, 318 a 14-319 b 2. The coming-to-be of one
substance is-onry-the passing-away of antther and vice versa, generation and destruction being no more than two sides of the same phenomenon. This is the reason that coming-to-be is perpetual from the point
of view of the material cause.

IX. viii, 1050 b 5-27.
~~. ~~.

II, xi. 338 b 7-20.

XII. vii, 1072 b 14-29; ix passim.
X, viii, 1178 b 22-23

XII, x, 1075 a 12-24.
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